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Abstract

The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) provides a framework for passing configuration information to hosts on a TCP/IP network. In some situations, network administrators may wish to constrain the allocation of addresses to authorized hosts. Additionally, some network administrators may wish to provide for authentication of the source and contents of DHCP messages. This document defines a new DHCP option through which authorization tickets can be easily generated and newly attached hosts with proper authorization can be automatically configured from an authenticated DHCP server.

1. Introduction

DHCP [1] transports protocol stack configuration parameters from centrally administered servers to TCP/IP hosts. Among those parameters are an IP address. DHCP servers can be configured to dynamically allocate addresses from a pool of addresses, eliminating
a manual step in configuration of TCP/IP hosts.

Some network administrators may wish to provide authentication of the source and contents of DHCP messages. For example, clients may be subject to denial of service attacks through the use of bogus DHCP servers, or may simply be misconfigured due to unintentionally instantiated DHCP servers. Network administrators may wish to constrain the allocation of addresses to authorized hosts to avoid denial of service attacks in "hostile" environments where the network medium is not physically secured, such as wireless networks or college residence halls.

This document defines a technique that can provide both entity authentication and message authentication.

DISCUSSION:

This draft combines the original Schiller-Huitema-Droms authentication mechanism (<draft-ietf-dhc-authentication-06.txt>) with the "delayed authentication" proposal developed by Bill Arbaugh. This draft has been published as a revision to <draft-ietf-dhc-authentication-06.txt>.

1.1 DHCP threat model

The threat to DHCP is inherently an insider threat (assuming a properly configured network where BOOTP ports are blocked on the enterprise’s perimeter gateways.) Regardless of the gateway configuration, however, the potential attacks by insiders and outsiders are the same.

The attack specific to a DHCP client is the possibility of the establishment of a "rogue" server with the intent of providing incorrect configuration information to the client. The motivation for doing so may be to establish a "man in the middle" attack or it may be for a "denial of service" attack.

There is another threat to DHCP clients from mistakenly or accidentally configured DHCP servers that answer DHCP client requests with unintentionally incorrect configuration parameters.

The threat specific to a DHCP server is an invalid client masquerading as a valid client. The motivation for this may be for "theft of service", or to circumvent auditing for any number of nefarious purposes.

The threat common to both the client and the server is the resource "denial of service" (DoS) attack. These attacks typically involve the
exhaustion of valid addresses, or the exhaustion of CPU or network bandwidth, and are present anytime there is a shared resource. In current practice, redundancy mitigates DoS attacks the best.

1.2 Design goals

These are the goals that were used in the development of the authentication protocol, listed in order of importance:

1. Address the threats presented in Section 1.1.
2. Avoid changing the current protocol.
3. Limit state required by the server.
4. Limit complexity (complexity breeds design and implementation errors).

1.3 Requirements Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY" and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [5].

1.4 DHCP Terminology

This document uses the following terms:

- "DHCP client"
  A DHCP client or "client" is an Internet host using DHCP to obtain configuration parameters such as a network address.

- "DHCP server"
  A DHCP server of "server" is an Internet host that returns configuration parameters to DHCP clients.

2. Format of the authentication option

The following diagram defines the format of the DHCP authentication option:
The code for the authentication option is TBD, and the length field contains the length of the protocol, algorithm and authentication information fields in octets. The protocol field defines the particular technique for authentication used in the option. The algorithm field defines the specific algorithm with the technique identified by the protocol field. The global replay counter field of the authentication option MUST be set to the value of a monotonically increasing counter. Using a counter value such as the current time of day (e.g., an NTP-format timestamp [4]) can reduce the danger of replay attacks.

This document defines two protocols in sections 4 and 5, encoded with protocol field values 0 and 1. Protocol field values 2-254 are reserved for future use. Other protocols may be defined according to the procedure described in section 6.

3. Interaction with Relay Agents

Because a DHCP relay agent may alter the values of the 'giaddr' and 'hops' fields in the DHCP message, the contents of those two fields MUST be set to zero for the computation of any hash function over the message header. Additionally, a relay agent may append the DHCP relay agent information option 82 [7] as the last option in a message to servers. If a server finds option 82 included in a received message, the server MUST compute any hash function as if the option were NOT included in the message without changing the order of options. If the server understands option 82 and will echo the option back to the relay agent, the server MUST not include the option in the computation of any hash function over the message.

4. Protocol 0

If the protocol field is 0, the authentication information field holds a simple authentication token:
The authentication token is an opaque, unencoded value known to both the sender and receiver. The sender inserts the authentication token in the DHCP message and the receiver matches the token from the message to the shared token. If the authentication option is present and the token from the message does not match the shared token, the receiver MUST discard the message.

Protocol 0 may be used to pass a plain-text password and provides only weak entity authentication and no message authentication. This protocol is only useful for rudimentary protection against inadvertently instantiated DHCP servers.

DISCUSSION:

The intent here is to pass a constant, non-computed token such as a plain-text password. Other types of entity authentication using computed tokens such as Kerberos tickets or one-time passwords will be defined as separate protocols.

5. Protocol 1

If the protocol field is 1, the message is using the "delayed authentication" mechanism. In delayed authentication, the client requests authentication in its DHCPDISCOVER message and the server replies with a DHCPOFFER message that includes authentication information information. This authentication information contains a nonce value generated by the source as a message authentication code (MAC) to provide message authentication and entity authentication.

This document defines the use of a particular technique based on the HMAC protocol [3] using the MD5 hash [2].
5.1 Management Issues

This protocol does not attempt to address situations where a client may roam from one administrative domain to another, i.e. interdomain roaming. This protocol is focused solving the intradomain problem where the out-of-band exchange of a shared secret is feasible.

5.2 Format

The format of the authentication request in a DHCPDISCOVER message for protocol 1 is:

+----------+----------+----------+----------+
|   Code   |    2     |    1     | Algorithm|
+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| Global Replay Counter                           ...
+----------+----------+----------+----------+

The format of the authentication information for protocol 1 is:

+----------+----------+----------+----------+
|   Code   |    n     |    1     | Algorithm|
+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| Global Replay Counter                           ...
+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| secret ID                                       |
+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| MAC                                              ...
+----------+----------+----------+----------+

This document defines one technique for use with protocol 1, which is identified by setting the algorithm field to 1. Other techniques that use different algorithms may be defined by future specifications, see section 6. The following definitions will be used in the description of the authentication information for protocol 1, algorithm 1:

Global Replay Counter - the value of a 64-bit monotonically increasing counter
K - a secret value shared between the source and destination of the message; each secret has a unique identifier
secret ID - the unique identifier for the secret value used to generate the MAC for this message
HMAC-MD5 - the MAC generating function [3, 2].

Droms
The sender computes the MAC using the HMAC generation algorithm [3] and the MD5 hash function [2]. The entire DHCP message (except as noted below), including the DHCP message header and the options field, is used as input to the HMAC-MD5 computation function. The ‘secret ID’ field MUST be set to the identifier of the secret used to generate the MAC.

DISCUSSION:

Algorithm 1 specifies the use of HMAC-MD5. Use of a different technique, such as HMAC-SHA, will be specified as a separate protocol.

Protocol 1 requires a shared secret key for each client on each DHCP server with which that client may wish to use the DHCP protocol. Each secret key has a unique identifier that can be used by a receiver to determine which secret was used to generate the MAC in the DHCP message. Therefore, protocol 1 may not scale well in an architecture in which a DHCP client may connect to multiple administrative domains.

Note that the meaning of an authentication option can be changed by removing the secret ID, and MAC, transforming an authentication option with authentication information into a request for authentication. Therefore, the authentication request form of this option can only appear in a DHCPDISCOVER message.

5.3 Message validation

To validate an incoming message, the receiver checks the ‘counter’ field and computes the MAC as described in [3]. If the ‘counter’ field does not contain a value larger than the last value of ‘counter’ used by the sender, the receiver MUST discard the incoming message. The receiver MUST set the ‘MAC’ field of the authentication option to all 0s for computation of the MAC, and because a DHCP relay agent may alter the values of the ‘giaddr’ and ‘hops’ fields in the DHCP message, the contents of those two fields MUST also be set to zero for the computation of the MAC. If the MAC computed by the receiver does not match the MAC contained in the authentication option, the receiver MUST discard the DHCP message.

5.4 Key utilization

Each DHCP client has a key, K. The client uses its key to encode any messages it sends to the server and to authenticate and verify any messages it receives from the server. The client’s key SHOULD be initially distributed to the client through some out-of-band
mechanism, and SHOULD be stored locally on the client for use in all authenticated DHCP messages. Once the client has been given its key, it SHOULD use that key for all transactions even if the client’s configuration changes; e.g., if the client is assigned a new network address.

Each DHCP server MUST know, or be able to obtain in a secure manner, the keys for all authorized clients. If all clients use the same key, clients can perform both entity and message authentication for all messages received from servers. However, the sharing of keys is strongly discouraged as it allows for unauthorized clients to masquerade as authorized clients by obtaining a copy of the shared key. To authenticate the identity of individual clients, each client MUST be configured with a unique key. Appendix A describes a technique for key management.

5.5 Client considerations

This section describes the behavior of a DHCP client using authentication protocol 1.

5.5.1 INIT state

When in INIT state, the client uses protocol 1 as follows:

1. The client MUST include the authentication request option in its DHCPDISCOVER message along with option 61 [6] to identify itself uniquely to the server.

2. The client MUST validate any DHCPOFFER messages that include authentication information using the mechanism specified in section 5.2. The client MUST discard any messages which fail to pass validation and MAY log the validation failure. The client selects one DHCPOFFER message as its selected configuration. If none of the DHCPOFFER messages received by the client include authentication information, the client MAY choose an unauthenticated message as its selected configuration. The client SHOULD be configurable to accept or reject unauthenticated DHCPOFFER messages.

3. The client replies with a DHCPREQUEST message that MUST include authentication information encoded with the same secret used by the server in the selected DHCPOFFER message.

4. The client MUST validate the DHCPACK message from the server. The client MUST discard the DHCPACK if the message fails to pass validation and MAY log the validation failure. If the DHCPACK fails to pass validation, the client MUST revert to INIT state and returns to step 1. The client MAY choose to remember which server replied with a DHCPACK message that
failed to pass validation and discard subsequent messages from that server.

5.5.2 INIT-REBOOT state

When in INIT-REBOOT state, the client MUST use the secret it used in its DHCPREQUEST message to obtain its current configuration to generate authentication information for the DHCPREQUEST message. The client MAY choose to accept unauthenticated DHCPACK/DHCPNAK messages if no authenticated messages were received. The client MUST treat the receipt (or lack thereof) of any DHCPACK/DHCPNAK messages as specified in RFC 2131, section 3.2.

5.5.3 RENEWING state

When in RENEWING state, the client uses the secret it used in its initial DHCPREQUEST message to obtain its current configuration to generate authentication information for the DHCPREQUEST message. If client receives no DHCPACK messages or none of the DHCPACK messages pass validation, the client behaves as if it had not received a DHCPACK message in section 4.4.5 of the DHCP specification [1].

5.5.4 REBINDING state

When in REBINDING state, the client uses the secret it used in its initial DHCPREQUEST message to obtain its current configuration to generate authentication information for the DHCPREQUEST message. If client receives no DHCPACK messages or none of the DHCPACK messages pass validation, the client behaves as if it had not received a DHCPACK message in section 4.4.5 of the DHCP specification [1].

5.5.5 DHCPINFORM message

Since the client already has some configuration information, the client may also have established a shared secret value, K, with a server. Therefore, the client SHOULD use the authentication request as in a DHCPOFFER message when a shared secret value exists. The client MUST treat any received DHCPACK messages as it does DHCPOFFER messages, see section 5.5.1.

5.6 Server considerations

This section describes the behavior of a server in response to client messages using authentication protocol 1.

5.6.1 General considerations
Each server maintains a list of secrets and identifiers for those secrets that it shares with clients and potential clients. This information must be maintained in such a way that the server can:

* Identify an appropriate secret and the identifier for that secret for use with a client that the server may not have previously communicated with
* Retrieve the secret and identifier used by a client to which the server has provided previous configuration information

Each server MUST save the counter from the previous authenticated message. A server MUST discard any incoming message whose counter is not strictly greater than the counter from the previous message to avoid replay attacks.

DISCUSSION:

The authenticated DHCPREQUEST message from a client in INIT-REBOOT state can only be validated by servers that used the same secret in their DHCPOFFER messages. Other servers will discard the DHCPREQUEST messages. Thus, only servers that used the secret selected by the client will be able to determine that their offered configuration information was not selected and the offered network address can be returned to the server’s pool of available addresses. The servers that cannot validate the DHCPREQUEST message will eventually return their offered network addresses to their pool of available addresses as described in section 3.1 of the DHCP specification [1].

5.6.2 After receiving a DHCPDISCOVER message

The server selects a secret for the client and includes authentication information generated by that secret as specified in section 4.1. The server MUST record the secret selected for the client and use that secret for validating subsequent messages with the client.

5.6.3 After receiving a DHCPREQUEST message

The server uses the secret identified in the message and validates the message as specified in section 4.2. If the message fails to pass validation or the server does not know the secret identified by the ‘secret ID’ field, the server MUST discard the message and MAY choose to log the validation failure.

If the message passes the validation procedure, the server responds as described in the DHCP specification. The server MUST include authentication information generated as specified in
5.6.4 After receiving a DHCPINFORM message

The server MAY choose to accept unauthenticated DHCPINFORM messages, or only accept authenticated DHCPINFORM messages based on a site policy.

When a client includes the authentication request in a DHCPINFORM message, the server MUST respond with an authenticated DHCPACK message. If the server does not have a shared secret value established with the sender of the DHCPINFORM message, then the server can either respond with an unauthenticated DHCPACK message, or a DHCPNACK if the server does not accept unauthenticated clients.

6. IANA Considerations

The author of a new DHCP option will follow these steps to obtain acceptance of the protocol as a part of the DHCP Internet Standard:

1. The author devises the new authentication protocol and/or algorithm.
2. The author documents the new technique as an Internet Draft. If this is a new protocol, the protocol code is left as "To Be Determined" (TBD); otherwise, the protocol code is the code from the existing protocol. The algorithm code is left as "TBD".
3. The author submits the Internet Draft for review through the IETF standards process as defined in "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1).
4. The new protocol progresses through the IETF standards process; the specification of the new protocol will be reviewed by the Dynamic Host Configuration Working Group (if that group still exists), or as an Internet Draft not submitted by an IETF working group. If the option is accepted as a Standard, the specification for the option is published as a separate RFC.
5. At the time of acceptance as an Internet Standard and publication as an RFC, IANA assigns a DHCP authentication protocol number to the new protocol.

This procedure for defining new authentication protocols will ensure that:

* allocation of new protocol numbers is coordinated from a single authority,
* new protocols are reviewed for technical correctness and
appropriateness, and
documentation for new protocols is complete and published.

**DISCUSSION:**
This procedure is patterned after the procedure for acceptance
of new DHCP options.

6. References

Bucknell University, March 1997.


[5] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement

draft-henry-DHCP-opt61-UUID-type-00.txt (work in
progress, November 1998.

draft-ietf-dhc-agent-options-05.txt (work in progress),
November 1998.

7. Acknowledgments

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8. Security considerations

This document describes authentication and verification mechanisms for DHCP.

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10. Expiration

This document will expire on December 31, 1999.
Appendix A - Key Management Technique

To avoid centralized management of a list of random keys, suppose K for each client is generated from the pair (client identifier, subnet address), which must be unique to that client. That is, $K = \text{MAC}(MK, \text{unique-id})$, where MK is a secret master key and MAC is a keyed one-way function such as HMAC-MD5.

Without knowledge of the master key MK, an unauthorized client cannot generate its own key K. The server can quickly validate an incoming message from a new client by regenerating K from the client-id. For known clients, the server can choose to recover the client’s K dynamically from the client-id in the DHCP message, or can choose to precompute and cache all of the Ks a priori.