Abstract

This document defines a YANG module for a system-level mechanism, called a "keystore", containing security-sensitive data including private keys, pinned certificates, and pinned SSH host-keys.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced with finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.

Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in progress. Please apply the following replacements:

- "VVVV" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft

Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement:

- "2017-10-18" --> the publication date of this draft

The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:

- Appendix A. Change Log

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

This document defines a YANG [RFC7950] module for a system-level mechanism, herein called a "keystore". The keystore provides a centralized location for security sensitive data, as described below.

This module has the following characteristics:

- A configurable list of keys, each a public/private key pair. If a key is used to sign a certificate signing request (CSR), which is then signed by a certificate authority (CA), then the resulting certificate may be configured as being associated with the key. Keys are expected to be configured using standard configuration mechanisms, however, to support hardware that generates keys, the key may also be created via an action called 'generate-private-key" action. Keys may also be preinstalled (e.g., a key associated to an IDevID [Std-802.1AR-2009] certificate).

- An unordered list of pinned certificate sets, where each pinned certificate set contains an unordered list of pinned certificates. This structure enables a server to use specific sets of pinned certificates on a case-by-case basis. For instance, one set of pinned certificates might be used by an HTTPS-client when connecting to particular HTTPS servers, while another set of pinned certificates might be used by a server when authenticating client connections (e.g., certificate-based client authentication).

- An unordered list of pinned SSH host key sets, where each pinned SSH host key set contains an unordered list of pinned SSH host keys. This enables a server to use specific sets of pinned SSH host-keys on a case-by-case basis. For instance, SSH clients can be configured to use different sets of pinned SSH host keys when connecting to different SSH servers.

- An action to request the server to generate a new key using the specified algorithm. The resulting key is present in <operational>.

- An action to request the server to generate a certificate signing request for an existing key. Passed into the action are the subject and attributes to be used, and returned is the CSR (certificate signing request) structure, signed by the key protected by the keystore. The CSR can be signed by an external certificate authority (CA). The signed certificate returned by the CA can be associated with the key in the keystore, using a standard configuration operation (<edit-config>).
A notification to indicate when a certificate is about to expire.

Special consideration has been given for systems that have Trusted Protection Modules (TPMs). These systems are unique in that the TPM must be directed to generate new keys (it is not possible to load a key into a TPM) and it is not possible to backup/restore the TPM's private keys as configuration.

It is not required that a system has an operating system level keystore utility to implement this module.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

1.2. Tree Diagram Notation

A simplified graphical representation of the data models is used in this document. The meaning of the symbols in these diagrams is as follows:

- Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys.
- Braces "{" and "}" enclose feature names, and indicate that the named feature must be present for the subtree to be present.
- Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" means configuration (read-write) and "ro" state data (read-only).
- Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional node, "!" means a presence container, and "*" denotes a list and leaf-list.
- Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case nodes are also marked with a colon (":").
- Ellipsis ("...") stands for contents of subtrees that are not shown.

2. Design Considerations

This document uses PKCS #10 [RFC2986] for the "generate-certificate-signing-request" action. The use of Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) [RFC4211] was considered, but it was unclear if there was market demand for it, and so support for CRMF has been left out.
of this specification. If it is desired to support CRMF in the future, placing a "choice" statement in both the input and output statements, along with an "if-feature" statement on the CRMF option, would enable a backwards compatible solution.

In order to use YANG identities for algorithm identifiers, only the most commonly used RSA key lengths are supported for the RSA algorithm. Additional key lengths can be defined in another module or added into a future version of this document.

This document limits the number of elliptical curves supported. This was done to match industry trends and IETF best practice (e.g., matching work being done in TLS 1.3). If additional algorithms are needed, they can be defined by another module or added into a future version of this document.

For the trusted-certificates list, Trust Anchor Format [RFC5914] was evaluated and deemed inappropriate due to this document’s need to also support pinning. That is, pinning a client-certificate to support NETCONF over TLS client authentication.

3. Tree Diagram

The keystore module has the following tree diagram. Please see Section 1.2 for information on how to interpret this diagram.
module: ietf-keystore
  +--rw keystore
  |  +--rw keys
  |     +--rw key* [name]
  |        |  +--rw name string
  |        |  +--rw algorithm identityref
  |        |  +--rw private-key union
  |        |  +--rw public-key binary
  |        +--rw certificates
  |              +--rw certificate* [name]
  |              |  +--rw name string
  |              |  +--rw value? binary
  |              +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
  |                  +---w input
  |                  |  +---w subject binary
  |                  |  +---w attributes? binary
  |                  +--ro output
  |                      +--ro certificate-signing-request binary
  |              +---x generate-private-key
  |                  +---w input
  |                  |  +---w name string
  |                  |  +---w algorithm identityref
  |              +--rw pinned-certificates* [name]
  |                  +--rw name string
  |                  +--rw description? string
  |                  +--rw pinned-certificate* [name]
  |                  |  +--rw name string
  |                  |  +--rw data binary
  |                  +--rw pinned-host-keys* [name]
  |                  |  +--rw name string
  |                  |  +--rw description? string
  |                  |  +--rw pinned-host-key* [name]
  |                  |     +--rw name string
  |                  |     +--rw data binary

notifications:
  +---n certificate-expiration
  |  +--ro certificate instance-identifier
  |  +--ro expiration-date yang:date-and-time

4. Example Usage

The following example illustrates what a fully configured keystore might look like. This keystore has three keys, four sets of trusted certificates, and one set of trusted host keys.

<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"
<!-- private keys and associated certificates -->
<keys>
  <key>
    <name>ex-rsa-key</name>
    <algorithm>rsa1024</algorithm>
    <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
    <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
    <certificates>
      <certificate>
        <name>ex-rsa-cert</name>
        <value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
      </certificate>
    </certificates>
  </key>
  <key>
    <name>tls-ec-key</name>
    <algorithm>secp256r1</algorithm>
    <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
    <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
    <certificates>
      <certificate>
        <name>tls-ec-cert</name>
        <value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
      </certificate>
    </certificates>
  </key>
  <key>
    <name>tpm-protected-key</name>
    <algorithm>rsa2048</algorithm>
    <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
    <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
    <certificates>
      <certificate>
        <name>builtin-idevid-cert</name>
        <value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
      </certificate>
      <certificate>
        <name>my-ldevid-cert</name>
        <value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
      </certificate>
    </certificates>
  </key>
</keys>

<!-- Manufacturer’s trust root CA certs -->
<pinned-certificates>
<name>manufacturers-root-ca-certs</name>
<description>
Certificates built into the device for authenticating
manufacturer-signed objects, such as TLS server certificates,
vouchers, etc..  Note, though listed here, these are not
configurable; any attempt to do so will be denied.
</description>
<pinned-certificate>
 <name>Manufacturer Root CA cert 1</name>
 <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
</pinned-certificate>
<pinned-certificate>
 <name>Manufacturer Root CA cert 2</name>
 <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
</pinned-certificate>
</pinned-certificates>

<!-- pinned netconf/restconf client certificates -->
<pinned-certificates>
 <name>explicitly-trusted-client-certs</name>
 <description>
 Specific client authentication certificates for explicitly
 trusted clients.  These are needed for client certificates
 that are not signed by a pinned CA.
 </description>
 <pinned-certificate>
  <name>George Jetson</name>
  <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
 </pinned-certificate>
</pinned-certificates>

<!-- pinned netconf/restconf server certificates -->
<pinned-certificates>
 <name>explicitly-trusted-server-certs</name>
 <description>
 Specific server authentication certificates for explicitly
 trusted servers.  These are needed for server certificates
 that are not signed by a pinned CA.
 </description>
 <pinned-certificate>
  <name>Fred Flintstone</name>
  <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
 </pinned-certificate>
</pinned-certificates>

<!-- trust anchors (CA certs) for authenticating clients -->
<pinned-certificates>
 <name>deployment-specific-ca-certs</name>
</pinned-certificates>
<description>
Trust anchors (i.e. CA certs) that are used to authenticate client connections. Clients are authenticated if their certificate has a chain of trust to one of these configured CA certificates.
</description>
<pinned-certificate>
  <name>ca.example.com</name>
  <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
</pinned-certificate>
</pinned-certificates>

<!-- trust anchors for random HTTPS servers on Internet -->
<pinned-certificates>
  <name>common-ca-certs</name>
  <description>
  Trusted certificates to authenticate common HTTPS servers. These certificates are similar to those that might be shipped with a web browser.
  </description>
  <pinned-certificate>
    <name>ex-certificate-authority</name>
    <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
  </pinned-certificate>
</pinned-certificates>

<!-- pinned SSH host keys -->
<pinned-host-keys>
  <name>explicitly-trusted-ssh-host-keys</name>
  <description>
  Trusted SSH host keys used to authenticate SSH servers. These host keys would be analogous to those stored in a known_hosts file in OpenSSH.
  </description>
  <pinned-host-key>
    <name>corp-fw1</name>
    <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
  </pinned-host-key>
</pinned-host-keys>
</keystore>

The following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing-request" action in use with the NETCONF protocol.
The following example illustrates the "generate-private-key" action in use with the NETCONF protocol.
The following example illustrates the "certificate-expiration" notification in use with the NETCONF protocol.

```
<notification xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0">
  <eventTime>2016-07-08T00:01:00Z</eventTime>
  <certificate-expiration xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
    <certificate xmlns:ks="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
    </certificate>
    <expiration-date>2016-08-08T14:18:53-05:00</expiration-date>
  </certificate-expiration>
</notification>
```

5. YANG Module

This YANG module imports modules defined in [RFC6536] and [RFC6991]. This module uses data types defined in [RFC2315], [RFC2986], [RFC3447], [RFC4253], [RFC5280], [RFC5915], and [ITU.X690.1994]. This module uses algorithms defined in [RFC3447] and [RFC5480].
module ietf-keystore {
  yang-version 1.1;

  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore";
  prefix "ks";

  import ietf-yang-types {
    prefix yang;
    reference
      "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
  }

  import ietf-netconf-acm {
    prefix nacm;
    reference
      "RFC 6536: Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) Access
      Control Model";
  }

  organization
    "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

  contact
    "WG Web:  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
    WG List:  <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
    Author:   Kent Watsen
              <mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>"

  description
    "This module defines a keystore to centralize management
    of security credentials.

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    as authors of the code. All rights reserved.

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    BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust’s
    Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

    This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see
    the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

  revision "2017-10-18" {
description
  "Initial version";
reference
  "RFC VVVV: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism";
}

// Identities

identity key-algorithm {
  description
    "Base identity from which all key-algorithms are derived.";
}

identity rsa1024 {
  base key-algorithm;
  description
    "The RSA algorithm using a 1024-bit key.";
  reference
    "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}

identity rsa2048 {
  base key-algorithm;
  description
    "The RSA algorithm using a 2048-bit key.";
  reference
    "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}

identity rsa3072 {
  base key-algorithm;
  description
    "The RSA algorithm using a 3072-bit key.";
  reference
    "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}

identity rsa4096 {
  base key-algorithm;
  description
    "The RSA algorithm using a 4096-bit key.";
  reference
    "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}
identity rsa7680 {
  base key-algorithm;
  description
    "The RSA algorithm using a 7680-bit key."
  reference
    "RFC3447": Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
    RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1."
}

identity rsa15360 {
  base key-algorithm;
  description
    "The RSA algorithm using a 15360-bit key."
  reference
    "RFC3447": Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
    RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1."
}

identity secp192r1 {
  base key-algorithm;
  description
    "The secp192r1 algorithm."
  reference
    "RFC5480":
    Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information."
}

identity secp256r1 {
  base key-algorithm;
  description
    "The secp256r1 algorithm."
  reference
    "RFC5480":
    Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information."
}

identity secp384r1 {
  base key-algorithm;
  description
    "The secp384r1 algorithm."
  reference
    "RFC5480":
    Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information."
}

identity secp521r1 {
  base key-algorithm;
  description
'The secp521r1 algorithm.';
reference
"RFC5480:
   Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}

// protocol accessible nodes

container keystore {
   nacm:default-deny-write;
   description
   "The keystore contains private keys, X.509 certificates, and
    SSH host keys.";
}

container keys {
   description
   "A list of public-private key pairs.";
   list key {
      key name;
      description
      "A public-private key pair.";
      leaf name {
         type string;
         description
         "An arbitrary name for the key.";
      }
      leaf algorithm {
         type identityref {
            base "key-algorithm";
         }
         mandatory true;
         description
         "Identifies the key’s algorithm. More specifically, this
          leaf specifies how the 'private-key' and 'public-key'
          binary leafs are encoded.";
      }
      leaf private-key {
         nacm:default-deny-all;
         type union {
            type binary;
            type enumeration {
               enum "hardware-protected" {
                  description
                  "The private key is inaccessible due to being
                   protected by a cryptographic hardware module
                   (e.g., a TPM).";
               }
            }
         }
      }
   }
}
mandatory true;
description

"A binary that contains the value of the private key. The
interpretation of the content is defined by the key
algorithm. For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA
key is represented as RSAPrivateKey as defined in
[RFC3447], and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
is represented as ECPrivateKey as defined in [RFC5915]";
reference

"RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
}
leaf public-key {
  type binary;
  mandatory true;
  description

  "A binary that contains the value of the public key. The
interpretation of the content is defined by the key
algorithm. For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA
key is represented as RSAPublicKey as defined in
[RFC3447], and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
is represented using the 'publicKey' described in
[RFC5915]";
reference

"RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
}
container certificates {
  description

  "Certificates associated with this private key. More
than one certificate per key is enabled to support,
for instance, a TPM-protected key that has associated
both IDevID and LDevID certificates.";
list certificate {
  key name;
  description

  "A certificate for this private key."

  leaf name {
    type string;
    description

    "An arbitrary name for the certificate. The name
must be unique across all keys, not just within
this key, as otherwise leafrefs to a certificate
might be ambiguous.";
  }
}
leaf value {
  type binary;
  description
  "A PKCS #7 SignedData structure, as specified by
  Section 9.1 in RFC 2315, containing just certificates
  (no content, signatures, or CRLs), encoded using ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
ITU-T X.690.

  This structure contains the certificate itself as well
as any intermediate certificates leading up to a trust
anchor certificate. The trust anchor certificate MAY
be included as well.";
  reference
  "RFC 2315:
   PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5.
   ITU-T X.690:
   Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
   Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
   Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
   Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}

action generate-certificate-signing-request {
  description
  "Generates a certificate signing request structure for
  the associated private key using the passed subject and
  attribute values. The specified assertions need to be
  appropriate for the certificate’s use. For example,
  an entity certificate for a TLS server SHOULD have
  values that enable clients to satisfy RFC 6125
  processing.";
  input {
    leaf subject {
      type binary;
      mandatory true;
      description
      "The ‘subject’ field from the CertificationRequestInfo
      structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1 encoded
      using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as
      specified in ITU-T X.690.";
      reference
      "RFC 2986:
       PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
       Version 1.7.
       ITU-T X.690:
       Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:

Watsen                   Expires April 20, 2018                [Page 17]
leaf attributes{
  type binary;
  description "The 'attributes' field from the CertificationRequestInfo structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."
                ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)."
}
}
}
output{
  leaf certificate-signing-request{
    type binary;
    mandatory true;
    description "A CertificationRequest structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."
                ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)."
  }
}
}
} // end key

action generate-private-key{
  description "Requests the device to generate a private key using the
specified key algorithm. This action is primarily to support cryptographic processors that must generate the private key themselves. The resulting key is considered operational state and hence only present in the <operational>.

```Yang
input {
  leaf name {
    type string;
    mandatory true;
    description 
      "The name the key should have when listed in /keys/key, in <operational>.";
  }
  leaf algorithm {
    type identityref {
      base "key-algorithm";
    }
    mandatory true;
    description 
      "The algorithm to be used when generating the key.";
  }
}
``` // end generate-private-key
} // end keys

list pinned-certificates {
  key name;
  description 
    "A list of pinned certificates. These certificates can be used by a server to authenticate clients, or by clients to authenticate servers. Each list of pinned certificates SHOULD be specific to a purpose, as the list as a whole may be referenced by other modules. For instance, a NETCONF server’s configuration might use a specific list of pinned certificates for when authenticating NETCONF client connections.";
  leaf name {
    type string;
    description 
      "An arbitrary name for this list of pinned certificates.";
  }
  leaf description {
    type string;
    description 
      "An arbitrary description for this list of pinned certificates.";
  }
  list pinned-certificate {
```
key name;
description
   "A pinned certificate.";
leaf name {
   type string;
description
   "An arbitrary name for this pinned certificate. The name must be unique across all lists of pinned certificates (not just this list) so that leafrefs from another module can resolve to unique values.";
}
leaf data {
   type binary;
   mandatory true;
description
   "An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC 5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
   "RFC 5280:
ITU-T X.690:
   Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
   Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
list pinned-host-keys {
   key name;
description
   "A list of pinned host keys. These pinned host-keys can be used by clients to authenticate SSH servers. Each list of pinned host keys SHOULD be specific to a purpose, so the list as a whole may be referenced by other modules. For instance, a NETCONF client’s configuration might point to a specific list of pinned host keys for when authenticating specific SSH servers.";
leaf name {
   type string;
description
   "An arbitrary name for this list of pinned SSH host keys.";
}
leaf description {
   type string;
}
description
   "An arbitrary description for this list of pinned SSH host keys.";
}

list pinned-host-key {
   key name;
   description
      "A pinned host key.";
   leaf name {
      type string;
      description
         "An arbitrary name for this pinned host-key. Must be unique across all lists of pinned host-keys (not just this list) so that a leafref to it from another module can resolve to unique values.";
   }
   leaf data {
      type binary;
      mandatory true;
      description
         "The binary public key data for this SSH key, as specified by RFC 4253, Section 6.6, i.e.:
         
         string certificate or public key format
         byte[n] key/certificate data.";
      reference
         "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
   }
}

notification certificate-expiration {
   description
      "A notification indicating that a configured certificate is either about to expire or has already expired. When to send notifications is an implementation specific decision, but it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a month for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and then once a day thereafter.";
   leaf certificate {
      type instance-identifier;
      mandatory true;
      description
         "Identifies which certificate is expiring or is expired.";
   }
}
6. Security Considerations

The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication.

The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC6536] provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of all available protocol operations and content.

There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

/: The entire data tree defined by this module is sensitive to write operations. For instance, the addition or removal of keys, certificates, trusted anchors, etc., can dramatically alter the implemented security policy. This being the case, the top-level node in this module is marked with the NACM value ‘default-deny-write’.

/keystore/keys/key/private-key: When writing this node, implementations MUST ensure that the strength of the key being configured is not greater than the strength of the underlying secure transport connection over which it is communicated. Implementations SHOULD fail the write-request if ever the strength of the private key is greater then the strength of the underlying transport, and alert the client that the strength of the key may have been compromised. Additionally, when deleting this node, implementations SHOULD automatically (without explicit request) zeroize these keys in the most secure manner.
available, so as to prevent the remnants of their persisted storage locations from being analyzed in any meaningful way.

Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

/keystore/keys/key/private-key: This node is additionally sensitive to read operations such that, in normal use cases, it should never be returned to a client. The best reason for returning this node is to support backup/restore type workflows. This being the case, this node is marked with the NACM value ‘default-deny-all’.

Some of the operations in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control access to these operations. These are the operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

generate-certificate-signing-request: For this action, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations assert channel binding [RFC5056], so as to ensure that the application layer that sent the request is the same as the device authenticated when the secure transport layer was established.

7. IANA Considerations

7.1. The IETF XML Registry

This document registers one URI in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is requested:

Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

7.2. The YANG Module Names Registry

This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the following registration is requested:
name:         ietf-keystore
prefix:       ks
reference:    RFC VVVV

8. Acknowledgements

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9. References

9.1. Normative References


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Appendix A. Change Log

A.1. server-model-09 to 00

- This draft was split out from draft-ietf-netconf-server-model-09.
- Removed key-usage parameter from generate-private-key action.
- Now /private-keys/private-key/certificates/certificate/name must be globally unique (unique across all private keys).
- Added top-level ’trusted-ssh-host-keys’ and ’user-auth-credentials’ to support SSH client modules.

A.2. keychain-00 to keystore-00

- Renamed module from ”keychain” to ”keystore” (Issue #3)

A.3. 00 to 01

- Replaced the ’certificate-chain’ structures with PKCS#7 structures. (Issue #1)
- Added ’private-key’ as a configurable data node, and removed the ’generate-private-key’ and ’load-private-key’ actions. (Issue #2)
- Moved ’user-auth-credentials’ to the ietf-ssh-client module. (Issues #4 and #5)

A.4. 01 to 02

- Added back ’generate-private-key’ action.
- Removed ’RESTRICTED’ enum from the ’private-key’ leaf type.
- Fixed up a few description statements.

A.5. 02 to 03

- Changed draft’s title.
- Added missing references.
- Collapsed sections and levels.
- Added RFC 8174 to Requirements Language Section.
- Renamed ’trusted-certificates’ to ’pinned-certificates’.
o Changed ‘public-key’ from config false to config true.

o Switched ‘host-key’ from OneAsymmetricKey to definition from RFC 4253.

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